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The aim of this paper is to contribute to the growing literature on competitive effects of 
overlapping ownership. Overlapping ownership means that competing firms have ownership in 
each other, this is known as cross-ownership, or are partially owned by a common investor or 
set of investors, known as common ownership. In this thesis, I focus on the former in the 
Norwegian publishing industry. The publishing industry is fairly concentrated, with four big 
firms generating more than 80 percent of the total revenues. Some of these firms have had 
varying degrees of partial ownership in smaller rival firms throughout the period. The industry 
is also characterized by a fixed price system, and a large extent of vertical integration. 
The analysis is based on a time series consisting of annual data over a 13-year period. I explore 
the price effects of changes in cross-ownership. According to the Norwegian Law of 
Competition, partial acquisitions which harm competition are prohibited. However, I do not 
find evidence that increases in cross-ownership has led to higher prices in the industry. Based 
on this analysis, increases in cross-ownership has not had anticompetitive effects in the 
publishing market. I do however believe that further analyses should be done, and I show how 
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Traditional oligopoly models assume that each firm in a market is owned by a separate agent, 
and that each agent attempts to maximize its own firm’s profits. All the firms in a market are in 
direct competition. If the firms are in Cournot competition (compete by setting quantity), then 
the prices will exceed the marginal cost by the HHI divided by the market elasticity. The HHI 
is a measure of market concentration, defined by each firm’s market share squared, where lower 
numbers imply healthier competition. In reality however, ownership is often spread between 
separate shareholders. Sometimes, firms might have ownership in competitors, or shareholders 
in the firm, might also own shares in their rivals. This is known as overlapping ownership. 
Recent years have seen a rapid increase in overlapping ownership. The implications of this on 
competition are heavily debated, and there are a lot of discussions as to whether antitrust 
authorities should intervene in markets with overlapping ownership. The intuitive reasoning 
behind the skepticism is understandable, as overlapping ownership leads to firms taking rivals’ 
profits into account in their decision-making process, leading to less aggressive competition, 
which results in higher prices and a lower output.  
Overlapping ownership is an umbrella term for cross-ownership and common ownership, which 
are similar but different ownership structures. Cross ownership is when a firm obtains a 
minority post in a competitor. Common ownership on the other hand, is when a group of 
investors (often institutional) have shares in competing firms. In the case of common 
ownership, each investor’s share will be smaller than that of the firm in the case of cross 
ownership. Common ownership is rational according to portfolio theory, which predicts that 
more diverse portfolios reduce risk. The focus of this paper however, will be cross-ownership. 
Bresnahan and Salop (1986) showed in a theoretical model how cross-ownership might result 
in anticompetitive outcomes. They developed a measure of overlapping ownership, the MHHI-
delta, which can be utilized to assess the effects it has on competition. Salop and O’Brien (2000) 
extended the MHHI-delta measure to apply to multiple joint ventures, and showed that the price 
increasing effect might also apply in a Bertrand setting. Recent empirical studies on overlapping 
ownership have mainly utilized the framework laid by Salop and O’Brien when estimating the 
effects of overlapping ownership. 
Theory predicts that the more overlapping ownership there is in a market, the more the outcome 
moves towards the monopoly outcome. Several empirical papers have found price increasing, 
and output reducing effects of increases in overlapping ownership. Especially cross-ownership 
is considered to have potential anticompetitive effects since an alignment of interests arises 
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between competitors as a result of the linking of profits. Due to this, the Norwegian Law of 
Competition specifically states that the acquisition of partial ownership is prohibited if it 
hinders effective competition. 
An industry in Norway with recent changes in cross-ownership is the publishing industry. 
Especially two of the biggest publishers, Gyldendal and Aschehoug, have partial ownership in 
rivals. The cross-ownership in the industry is however, mainly these two firms having partial 
ownership in smaller firms. In this paper I study the price effects of cross-ownership in the 
Norwegian publishing market. I also regress to see if the overall market turnover is impacted. 
Theory predicts that in concentrated markets, competition will be harmed by increases in cross-
ownership. The Norwegian publishing market is fairly concentrated, and there is cross-
ownership, which makes it interesting an interesting case to study. The Norwegian publishing 
market is also dominated by Norwegian firms, the competition is therefore between domestic 
firms. The market is quite unique with its fixed price system, which ensures that all books will 
be sold at a fixed price until April 30. the year after release. The publishers set the price at 
which the book is sold at the bookstore. The fixed price is meant to prevent price competition 
on the best-selling books, the revenues from this is then meant to finance smaller literature 
(Konkurransetilsynet, 2018). Since the publishers decide the price the first year after release, 
the bookstores are safe from price competition in that period. As prices are fixed for about a 
year, it seems reasonable to assume that the outcome is higher prices, at least until the fixed 
price period expires.  
The publishing industry is rather unique compared to other sectors in the Norwegian economy 
in other ways as well. There is a lot of vertical integration, as the big publishers own many of 
the distributors, book clubs, and bookstores. As a result, the publishers have a lot of power. The 
industry is also rather concentrated, and some of the biggest firms have partial ownership in 
smaller rivals. Lastly, there is the fixed price system, which is meant to encourage diverse 
literature. All of these factors impact the price. In addition to this, the Norwegian Law of 
Competition § 16 a clearly states that the acquisition of partial ownership is prohibited if it 
hinders effective competition. When evaluating if competition is hindered, they try to determine 
how the partial acquisition will change the current state of competition in the form of non-
coordinated and coordinated effects. Coordinated effects are often in the form of tacit collusion, 
and whether or not the partial acquisition will help the firms in the market find an agreed price 
level, but it can also be a silent agreement to not approach each other’s customers. Non-
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coordinated effects are all other competition harming effects, for instance, if the equilibrium 
price level rises or if entry barriers arise following the acquisition.  
I seek to discover whether or not this is the case in the Norwegian publishing industry, and if 
the Competition Authorities should intervene. Specifically, I seek to discover if the increase in 
cross-ownership has increased book prices in Norway. To this end, I regress the inflation 
adjusted price on the MHHI-delta. Positive coefficients, which are statistically significant at a 
1%-level, at the very least, would imply that antitrust authorities should investigate. However, 
evaluations regarding the consumer surplus effects must still be made. Whether or not a price 
increase is economically significant can be evaluated by looking at the industry profit margins. 
If the profit margin is positive, and a partial acquisition is expected to increase price levels, 
competition authorities might prevent it, unless other factors, like spillover effects, leading to 
enhanced productivity compensates. Unfortunately, I do not have the profit margins of the 
publishers, and in this thesis, I solely focus on the price effects of cross-ownership. 
I find that when regressing the price on cross-ownership, we get positive coefficients however, 
most of the coefficients of cross-ownership are not statistically significant, and none of my 
findings are statistically significant at a 1%-level. In other words, I find no evidence that implies 
a need for the Competition Authorities to intervene. Nor do I find evidence that the market 
concentration has led to price increases. As there are markets that are more concentrated, and 
with more cross-ownership, I would expect the price effects to be smaller than those found in 
other empirical works. In addition, due to time limitations, the dataset is not as complete as it 
could be, and as a result, the statistical significance of the results is not very high. As there are 
quite few observations, one should also be aware of the potential for spurious correlations, as 
common trends might be picked up as causal in my analysis. I do however address this by 
including a time trend variable. I also address potential model misspecifications, and conduct 
alternative analyses. While I do not find is cause for intervening, I do believe that more research 
on cross-ownership in the publishing sector should be done.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses theory on overlapping ownership, and 
related literature. Section 3 describes the data used, and shows my hypothesis. Section 4 shows 
my empirical analyses, and discusses the results and their validity, while Section 5 discusses 





2.1 Literature review 
In this paper I seek to analyze the price effects of the cross-ownership in the publishing industry 
in Norway. As far as I am aware this has not been done yet. Though similar studies have been 
conducted in other countries and industries. This paper aims to contribute to the debate 
regarding the effects of cross ownership and also the debate in Norway regarding the oligopoly 
in the publishing industry. An advantage of doing such an analysis in the Norwegian market is 
the accessible and reliable data.  
Overlapping ownership 
Throughout the years there has been a lot of debate and theoretical papers discussing the effects 
of overlapping ownership. Hart (1979) noted that shareholders may not always agree on a firm’s 
objective or how to achieve the goal due to imperfect information, which often leads to losses 
in consumer surplus. Differences in shareholder preferences thus has a fairly long history of 
research. Furthermore, there is a large extent of papers arguing that investors with diversified 
portfolios will aim to maximize their joint portfolio profits rather than the individual firm 
profits, or increase each individual firm profits, by lowering direct competition pressure 
between overlappingly owned firms. Should this hold, then overlapping ownership could have 
a negative societal impact as product markets might not be perfectly competitive. 
Reynolds and Snapp (1986) use oligopoly theory with the addition of allowing for cross-
ownership in the model. They assume Cournot competition rather than Bertrand competition. 
They find that in markets where entry is difficult, partial ownership in competing firms could 
result in less output and higher prices. In other words, the more cross ownership there is between 
competitors, the more the outcome will converge towards the monopoly outcome. They argue 
that this happens because the fortunes of the two companies will be linked, and thus a positive 
correlation arises between their profits. However, this is not a result of collusion, it is rather that 
the linking of profits gives the firms an incentive to compete less aggressively in order to 
achieve a joint profit maximization. Thus, as cross-ownership arises, the joint firms are less 
incentivized to compete aggressively since their own profits will increase if the partially owned 
firm increases its profits.  In that way it resembles a merger outcome. They show that if one or 
more of the Cournot competitors increase their level of ownership in rival firms, the equilibrium 
output will decline. Azar (2012) and Banal-Estanol et al. (2020) find similar outcomes. While 
Bresnahan (1986) use a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (MHHI) to evaluate the effects. 
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The MHHI has since been widely used in studies of overlapping ownership and the effects that 
arise from it. 
 Hansen (1996) points out, the shareholders want a policy of internalization between firm 
externalities. In other words, the firms will pursue portfolio maximization, and thus behave 
differently from firms that pursue value maximization. Hansen then proceeds to use a simple 
oligopolistic model of competing firms to illustrate his point. In the model he assumes non-
consuming shareholders. 
Gilo et al. (2006) show that cross ownership can have a negative effect on competition in a 
theoretical model. They assume Bertrand competition unlike most of the other studies. 
Azar (2012) studies the effects of common ownership in an oligopoly setting, including one 
where he looks at the implicit collusion effects arising from common ownership. He states that 
in the extreme case, where all shareholders are completely diversified, the firms act as if they 
are owned by a single monopolist. The more diversified the shareholders of the competing firms 
are, the closer we get to this result. He assumes that a firms’ objective is decided by majority 
voting, and that one share equates to one vote. He also showed the rapid increase in common 
ownership in the United States between 2000 and 2010. 
Historically, most of the empirical literature has not considered the effects of overlapping 
ownership when analyzing markets. In recent years however, this issue has gained momentum. 
Azar et al. (2018) are among the people in the forefront of this issue, and they found that 
common ownership has had an effect of increased ticket prices in the airline market. Azar et al. 
(2018) goes on to point out that with common ownership, the owners do not necessarily need 
to explicitly communicate their incentives in order for the anticompetitive effects to arise. The 
owners can just avoid incentivizing tough competition between the portfolio firms. This is due 
to the “quiet life effect” as documented by Bertrand & Mullainathan (2003), who found that 
unless closely monitored, managers will not always pursue goals in the shareholders’ interest. 
Though the quiet life effect might impact firm decisions, it seems more likely that the effects 
found by Anton et al. (2020) below have an effect. Azar et al. (2018) focused on the airline 
industry, and considered each route a separate market. He related common ownership 
concentration to prices within the same firm, period and industry. He found that when including 
common ownership in the calculation of market concentration, the market was far more 




Lopes and Vives (2019) on the other hand, claim that overlapping ownership can increase 
consumer welfare, but only if the spillover effects are large enough to counter potential 
anticompetitive effects. While they claim it is possible, they do concede that it is mainly 
relevant in highly innovative sectors.   
Similar to Azar, Torshizi & Clapp (2019) empirically examines the price effects of common 
ownership. They look at the seed sector, and find similar results. 
Anton et al. (2020) study how common ownership affects the managerial incentives and how 
hard they compete with rival firms. They find that in the case of common ownership the 
shareholders will want to make the managers contract less performance sensitive, and thus 
reduce the firms’ incentive to compete aggressively, which in turn increases the shareholders’ 
profits. They show that firms with common ownership are far less likely to have performance 
sensitive contracts. 
Backus et al. (2020) however point out some measurement problems in previous empirical 
evaluations, and thus questions regarding the validity of the papers arise. They point to the fact 
that the data used often does not correspond to the level at which decisions are made. 
Furthermore, the data does not distinguish short positions from long ones. They also state that 
the influence of investors on firm decisions is not necessarily endogenously given simply by 
their share in the company, so if an investor owns 10% of a company, he does not necessarily 
have 10% control of the company. They have also done research on common ownership 
between 1980 and 2017 in the US (Backus, Conlon, & Sinkinson, 2019), and while they find 
an increase in common ownership in the period, they do not conclude that it has brought 
anticompetitive effects, they did not find substantial evidence of the increase in common 
ownership having led to higher prices or a lower output. In January 2021 they released a paper 
in common ownership in the cereal industry, where they find support for the more classic theory 
of own-profit maximization (Backus, Conlon, & Sinkinson, 2021). 
One of the biggest believers in antitrust regulations towards overlapping ownership is Einer 
Elhauge. In his paper (2020), he discusses the critiques of Azar’s (2018) and other similar 
papers, and argues that, while many of their concerns regarding the results are valid, if one were 
to correct for these changes, the anticompetitive effects would be larger than those shown. He 
also claims that even in the absence of collusion, or any sort of communication between owners, 
the anticompetitive effects arise due to owner interest alignment. An argument used against the 
results which show a price increase due to overlapping ownership, is that the market shares are 
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captured in both the HHI and the MHHI. Elhauge however, claims that, while the endogeneity 
issues are valid, the outcome if one addresses this concern will be even more anticompetitive. 
Others have pointed out that overlapping ownership is only a problem in concentrated markets. 
To this, Elhauge points out that the same can be said regarding mergers, and there are antitrust 
regulations to prevent mergers which reduce competition.  
 
Book Industry 
In recent years there has also been a lot of discussion regarding the publishing companies in 
Norway, and whether the Competition Authorities should intervene in this oligopolistic market. 
This segment in dominated by Cappelen Damm, Gyldendal, Vigmostad & Bjørke, and 
Aschehoug. The four of them had, according to Bransjestatistikk (2019), more than 80 % of the 
net turnover of book sales in 2019. While the four biggest firms in 2007 had just short of 64 % 
of the net turnover in 2007. Showing an increasing trend. 
Oslo Economics (2011) also show that there is a lot of vertical integration in the industry. The 
big publishing companies own most of the big bookstores. Tanum, Ark Bokhandel and Norli 
are all owned by these big publishers. They find potential gains from the vertical integration, 
however, they are more concerned with the horizontal cooperation, as this is more likely to 
cause anticompetitive effects. Vertical integration can increase productivity and reduce costs, 
while horizontal integration is less likely to show similar effects. 
Menon Economics (Grimsby, 2019) look into the increased market concentration in Norway 
and the market concentration when taking overlapping ownership into account. They show a 
steady increase in the market concentration in the publishing sector, especially when accounting 
for cross-ownership. 
 
2.2 Theory of overlapping ownership 
There is a lot of theory on overlapping ownership. Some predict that it will have anticompetitive 
effects, while others argue that spillover effects might negate this, and that it may actually be 
beneficial from a societal perspective. While most of the theory seems to assume Cournot 
competition, some use a Bertrand model. 
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In a two-firm Cournot model, with market values v1 and v2, as in Hansen (1996). They produce 
x1 and x2, and their value depends on the competitors’ actions. We have: 
1) V1 = v1(x1 , x2) 
2) V2 = v2 x1 , x2) 
Classic oligopoly theory predicts that both firms will attempt to maximize their own profits by 
taking their rivals actions into account. However, Hansen (1996) asks what would happen if 
both firms are owned by a single owner (which would represent a merger outcome) and what 
would happen if several owners own an equal share in both companies. He compares the classic 
outcome with the two others. An important assumption here is that the firms act according to 
their owners’ interests, this eliminates any agency problems. Assuming no transaction costs, 
















With transaction costs however, the ownership structures affect the decision making. With a 
single owner, we have the same as above. Separate owners will maximize their own profits, and 
unless cooperation can be maintained, this will not be the joint maximization outcome, but 
rather the previously mentioned classic outcome.  
In the case of diversified shareholders, the shareholders might opt for the joint value 
maximization, but in this case, they will not care how the value is distributed between the firms, 
given equal ownership in each firm. The shareholder will just want to maximize v1+v2. As the 
real world often has transaction costs (also counting incentive to maintain cooperation) the 
Coasian joint maximization solution is not a very likely outcome unless the owners are perfectly 
diversified, and their interests are aligned. In other words, if the owners of the firms are perfectly 
diversified, the case of the diversified shareholders will be equal to that of a single common 
owner. The assumption is thus, the more diversified between competitors the owners are, the 
closer we get to the merger outcome, which in this example is the monopoly outcome.  
The impact of your decisions on the competitions profits is an externality. If your firm decides 
to produce less, then their competitors’ profits might go up as a result of increased demand for 
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their product. With perfectly diversified portfolios, the shareholders aim to internalize these 
externalities in order to maximize their portfolio value. 
2.2.1 Common ownership 
One can look at the decision making from a game theory perspective, and observe how the 
ownership structures affect the equilibrium price and quantity. We assume that the two firms 
produce homogenous goods and have common owners, i = 1,….,M (Torshizi & Clapp, 2019). 
The common owners own β percent shares of firm 2 and α percent shares of firm 1. If the 
ownership creates any amount of control over the firm, it must incorporate their interests in 
their decisions. In the case of common owners, their interests would include the competitions’ 
profits. If we assume that there is a linear one-to-one relationship between ownership shares 
and control, as Salop and O’Brien (2000) showed, then the profit maximization problem for the 
firms becomes: 
5) 𝜋1 = 𝜋1
1 + 𝛽𝜋2
2 and 𝜋2 = 𝜋2
2 + 𝛼𝜋1
1   
Where π1 and π2 are the what firms need to maximize and 𝜋1
1 and 𝜋2
2 are each firms’ individual 
profits, which are given by: 
6) 𝜋1
1 = 𝑃(𝑋) × 𝑋1 − 𝑚𝑐𝑋1 − 𝐹𝐶1 and 𝜋2
2 = 𝑃(𝑋) × 𝑋2 − 𝑚𝑐𝑋2 − 𝐹𝐶2 
In this equation 𝑃(𝑋) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑋 shows the inverse demand for the total produced quantity,   X 
= X1 + X2. mc represents the marginal cost, assumed to be equal for the firms, and FC is the 





= 𝛼 − 2𝑏𝑋1 − 𝑏𝑋2 − 𝛽𝑏𝑋2 − 𝑚 = 0,
𝜕𝜋2
𝜕𝑋2
= 𝛼 − 𝑏𝑋1 − 2𝑏𝑋2 − 𝛼𝑏𝑋2 − 𝑚 = 0 







































In classic oligopoly theory it is assumed that there is no common ownership, meaning α=β=0. 
Which implies equilibrium quantities 𝑋1 = 𝑋2 =
𝑎−𝑚
3𝑏










> 0 and 𝛼 − 𝑚 > 0. We see that an increase in common ownership leads to higher 
prices as a result of an alignment of the firms’ interests. 
 
2.2.2 Cross-ownership 
An example of work on cross-ownership is done by Gilo et al. (2006) who uses a repeated 
Bertrand model. The theory in this section shows that when a firm holds shares, even if they 
are non-controlling, in an industry rival, their incentives to sustain tacit collusion might 
increase. This results in higher equilibrium prices and a lower quantity. 
The model assumes n homogenous firms, with equal marginal costs. With collusion firms can 
charge the monopoly price, and receive the monopoly profit divided by the number of firms. 
This collusive outcome is reasonable, and can be sustained if the discount factor is high enough: 




Gilo et al. (2006) studies how cross-ownership affects the critical discount factor, and show that 
cross-ownership can increase the incentives for tacit collusion. Tacit collusion itself is not 
illegal, but mergers which can increase the likelihood of it, can be stopped. Similar rules should 
perhaps be applied to increases in cross-ownership. 
Reynolds and Snapp (1986) however, show that even without collusion, cross-ownership can 
induce higher prices and lower quantities. They use a Cournot model where none of the firms 
are aware of the interdependent consequences of their actions. They assume that the conditions 
for a stable Cournot equilibrium holds. In the model they separate firms and plants. The firms 
are the profit-maximizing decisionmakers, while they own/control plants. Furthermore, each 
firm receives profits from ownership interests in jointly owned plants they have no controller 
rights in. The plants produce the product and sells it at market price, and the profits are shared 
among the owners. If a plant is co-owned by two or more firms, then one firm decides its output, 
while the profits are disbursed among each owners’ share of the plant. 
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The model assumes n firms, where firm i controls the output, q, of plant i. The product and the 
marginal costs are assumed to be equal for all plants. There are also entry barriers. The profits, 
π, of firm i are: 
12) 𝜋𝑖 = (1 − ∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑖
𝑘≠𝑖
𝑘 )(𝑝 − 𝑚𝑐)𝑞𝑖 + ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑘(𝑝 − 𝑚𝑐)𝑞𝑘
𝑘≠𝑖
𝑘  
(Reynolds & Snapp, 1986) 
Where p is the market price, mc is the marginal cost, qi is the output controlled by firm i while 
qk is the output controlled by firm k. Finally, vki is firm k’s ownership interest in firm i or in 
jointly owned plants controlled by firm i, and vice versa with vik. 
They go on to show that if a firm decides to increase its ownership in a competitor, the market 
output will decrease. The model assumes a cross-ownership structure, v and ?̃? where v>?̃? if 
vik>?̃?𝑖𝑘 for at least one i and k and v=?̃? if not. The output under structure v will therefore be 
lower than under ?̃?. 
If ?̃? represents all the ownership interests that links the firms, and ?̃? is the quantity produced in 










?̃?𝑘 = 0, here: 
𝑉𝑖 = ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑘
𝑘≠𝑖
𝑘  and  
𝑉𝑘 = ∑ 𝑣𝑘𝑖
𝑘≠𝑖
𝑘   








The first part of equation 14) shows the demand and the cost factors of production. It is in this 
part of the equation, in a standard oligopoly model the firm must decide its optimal price in a 
trade-off between a loss of customers, and increased revenue from each of the remaining 
customers. The second part of the equation shows the effects the ownership interests. 
These ownership interests can, as we see in 14), affect the output of firm i. To see the ownership 
effects, one can differentiate 14) with respect to 𝑣𝑖𝑘, this shows the equilibrium effects of firm 
i increasing its ownership in other firms. In addition, differentiating with respect to ?̃?𝑘𝑖 shows 
how firm i’s output changes as a result of competitors increasing their ownership in firm i. First, 










Due to ?̃?𝑘 being less than one, if ?̃? is a positive number, the term is negative. In other words, if 
firm i increases its ownership in a competitor, its own optimal output will decrease given the 








Given that only positive numbers are allowed, this term is negative, which implies that firm i 
will desire a lower output if rivals increase their ownership in them. 
We see that if firm i increases its ownership in a rival, or a rival increases its ownership in firm 
i, the output of firm i will be reduced in both instances. Similarly, we could have shown that 
the price would increase. Therefore, if cross-ownership moves from ?̃? to v the output decreases. 
The firms that are unaffected by the ownership changes however, would increase their own 
production, but not by enough to counter the reduced output by the affected firms. This shows 
that ownership change the firm’s best reaction. The firms want a lower output if firms they have 
an ownership stake in reduce their output. The independent firms will have the same best 
response function as previously. Depending on each firm’s cost and demand, and if they are not 
similar, the output changes may vary, but the reduction in aggregate output remains. The bigger 
the market shares of the of the cross-owned firms, the bigger the output reductions will be. 
These results do however depend on entry barriers in the market.  
Equation 14) is useful as it shows how a small ownership change can affect output. If we assume 
five equal firms, all unlinked, and that one firm then decides to buy a 10 percent share in a rival, 
the output will decrease by 0,2 percent. However, if all five own 10 percent in each other, the 
aggregate output would be 10% less than in the case of no cross-ownership. This shows that the 
more cross-ownership there is, the closer we get to the monopoly outcome. In the extreme 
example, when 𝑣 =
1
𝑛
 with n homogenous firms, all linked, we get the monopoly outcome. 
When examining the effects of cross-ownership, it is not enough to analyze a firm’s direct 
ownership in a competitor. One must also account for the indirect ownership. For instance, if 
firm i owns 50% of firm j, and firm j owns 50% of firm k, then firm i will indirectly own 25% 
of firm k, and obtain 25% of their profits. This means that regardless of firm i’s control over j 
(and k), these firms will be incentivized to increase firm i’s profits. 
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Anton et al (2020) considers common ownership, rather than cross-ownership. Their theory 
predicts that in the case of common ownership, managerial contracts will be designed to prevent 
aggressive competition between the shareholders’ portfolio firms. They show that the 
managerial contracts are less performance sensitive when there is common ownership. In other 
words, the managers are less incentivized to outperform competitors. The outcome of this is 
less output and higher prices. This might also be the case under cross-ownership, as the 
acquiring firm will have board seats in the acquired firm when becoming a partial owner. As I 
will show later, this reduces the incentives for aggressive competition in itself, but it may be 
that managerial contracts are also made to prevent aggressive competition. This paper does not 
look at managerial contract changes following cross-ownership changes, but the reader should 
be aware of the potential for this to happen. 
 
2.2.3 Salop and O’Brien 
Salop and O’Brien (2000) also do a similar analysis where they separate two properties of 
partial control. They show that even when assuming that there is no tacit collusion, and the 
firms are competitors, cross-ownership will affect the market outcomes. If one firm has shares 
in another, they argue that it is important to distinguish financial interests and control rights. 
The financial interests here means that the acquiring firm has rights to a share of the acquired 
firms’ profits. The control rights are the acquiring firm’s ability to influence or even control the 
decisions of the acquired firm. Some shares might not give control or voting rights, but still 
entitles one to parts of the profits. They (Salop and O’Brien 2000) argue that the financial 
interests affect the interests of the acquiring firm, while the control rights affect the interests of 
the acquired firm. Simply put, a firm with partial ownership, but no control rights, in a 
competitor will have less incentive to compete aggressively as an increase in their rival’s profit 
will increase their own due to their ownership. In this situation the acquired firm’s incentive to 
compete aggressively might remain unchanged. If we assume control rights however, then they 
might compete less aggressively too. 
 In a situation where most of the shares are non-voting shares, a minority shareholder might 
hold the control rights. Should the controlling minority shareholder be a competing firm he 
might for instance increase the firm’s prices, which diverts customers to his own firm.  
To show this, imagine a standard oligopoly, with no cross-ownership oligopoly where firm i 
has a price of $100 and 16 customers, their cost is assumed to be $80 and they sell all the units 
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they produce (Salop and O’Brien, 2000). Their current profits would then be $320. If firm i 
were to consider raising its price by $10, and this would result in a loss of eight customers, the 
profits would be reduced by $160 from the customers moving to competitors. However, they 
would also gain $10 from each of the eight remaining customers resulting in $80 gain from the 
remaining customers resulting in a net profit of -$80. This price increase would therefore not 
be worth it.  
Now let’s consider the case with cross-ownership. If we assume that firm i has a 25% ownership 
in firm j, and the eight diverted customers from the previous example decide to move to firm j. 
Firm i still get a reduced net profit of $80, however, firm j gains eight customers, and thus their 
profits are increased. If we assume that firm j has a cost of $50, and still has a price of $100, 
then their profits would increase by $400. Since firm i has 25% financial interest in firm j they 
would be entitled to $100 of the profits, thus providing firm i with an overall net gain of $20 
from the price increase.  
A price increase of 10% is however, a fairly large increase, and works in this example due to 
the assumed cost asymmetries. If we assume homogenous firms, where both have costs of $80 
per unit, the price increase would be smaller, but the effect remains. Suppose firm i increases 
its price by 2,5%. They now charge $102,5 for the product, and this results in two customers 
diverting to firm j. Firm i loses $20 on each diverting customer, resulting in a loss of $40. 
Meanwhile, they gain an increased $2,5 on each of the fourteen remaining customers, which 
sums to $35. Without cross-ownership this would result in a net loss of $5 from the price 
increase. If both of the diverted customers move to firm j (like they would in a duopoly), they 
earn a margin of $40 from the two customers. With firm i owning 25% of firm j, they would be 
entitled to $10 of the increase in firm j’s profit. This results in firm i having a net gain of $5 
from a price increase of 2,5% in the situation with cross-ownership, whereas they would have 
a net loss of $5 (and consequently not increase their price) if there were no cross-ownership. 
Salop and O’Brien (2000) use similar examples to show that partial cross-ownership gives the 
acquiring firm an incentive to increase their price, thereby damaging competition and reducing 
consumer surplus. When competition authorities evaluate whether a merger should be approved 
or not, they often look at the diversion rates and margins to see how many customers are 
recaptured from customers moving from one of the merged firms to the other and the increases 
in their margins if one increases its price. The above example shows that a similar analysis 
might be beneficial in cases of cross-ownership. 
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We have now shown that cross-ownership can harm consumer surplus if the ownership only 
implies financial interest, but no control rights. The outcome of this is shown in 9) and 10), 
where we, as mentioned, assume that there is a linear one-to-one relationship between 
ownership and control. 
Another instance of cross-ownership often seen is that of horizontally joint ventures. That is, 
firm i, j, and k are all competitors, but firm k is owned by firm i and firm j. This structure is, 
according to Salop and O’Brien (2000) more complicated to analyze due to multiple owners 
with partial ownership interests and there is a larger set of governance structures. If, for 
instance, firm i has control rights in firm k, but firm j has more financial interest we get far less 
competition pressure than would be the case if firm i also had financial interests (see Salop and 
O’Brien, 2000). This is because firm i can raise firm k’s price a lot without losing a lot of profit, 
due to low financial interest, and they might gain half, or perhaps even more, of the diverted 
customers from firm k. The final outcome in this situation will depend on the diversion rates, 
the margins, the financial interests, and the control rights of firms i and k. In the Norwegian 
publishing industry, this is what we see. The big companies do not have ownership in each 
other (a few do in fact have shares in Gyldendal, but as they have less than 0,5% we exclude 
that from this analysis), but we see a fair share of horizontally joint ventures.  
 
2.2.4 HHI and MHHI 
The previous section helps explain the intuitive reasoning for concerns regarding cross-
ownership by using simple assumptions about the market. However, in the real market, things 
are usually a lot more complex. A tool commonly utilized to help analyze the effects of 
overlapping ownership, both theoretically, and empirically, is the modified Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, commonly known as MHHI. It is a modified version of the HHI which is a 
measure of market concentration commonly used when evaluating whether mergers should be 
approved.  
In Europe, a market is considered unconcentrated if the HHI is below 0.1, and any merger will 
generally be accepted. Furthermore, intervening in a merger, or a buyout is unlikely if the HHI 
is between 0.1 and 0.2 after the merger, and the change in HHI is less than 0.025. Similarly, if 
the HHI is more than 0.2 after the merger, competition authorities are unlikely to intervene if 
the change in HHI is below 0.015. A market with HHI above 0.2 is considered highly 
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concentrated, while markets with an HHI between 0.1 and 0.2 is moderately concentrated 
(Nærings- og Fiskeridepartementet, 2012). 
The MHHI is a measure of the market concentration if one accounts for overlapping ownership. 
It was first developed by Bresnahan & Salop (1986) and then extended by Salop & O’Brien 
(2000). The difference between the MHHI, and the HHI, is known as the MHHI-delta, and it is 
the one commonly used in empirical analyses. While the one developed by Bresnahan & Salop 
accounts for cross-ownership, it only assumes one firm has partial interest in one competitor. 
The developed version of the MHHI allows for multiple firms (or investors) having ownership 
interests in multiple competitors. The MHHI is formulated as: 




An attractive feature of the MHHI is that it can be decomposed into two parts, consisting of the 
standard HHI and the MHHI-delta, which is the change in MHHI, that is, the change in 
ownership structures: 
18) ∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑘
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑘𝑖
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑖
𝑘𝑗 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗




The left-hand side of 18) is the MHHI, as shown in 17). The first part of the right-hand side is 
the HHI while the second part is the MHHI-delta. In these equations, 𝛽𝑖𝑗 is the fraction of firm 
j owned by owner i (could be firm or investor and this represents the financial interest), while 
𝛾𝑖𝑗  represents i’s control rights over firm j. Firm j’s market share is 𝑠𝑗. 
In other words, the MHHI-delta is a measure of the amount of overlapping ownership in a 
market. This is what we use when attempting to analyze the price effects of cross-ownership. I 
run regressions in an attempt to discover whether increases in cross-ownership is associated 
with price increases.  
The MHHI-delta expression is a general one, which captures different governance structures, 
from silent financial interests to complete control. Salop & O’Brien (2000) also show the 
formula for each of the different governance structures, shown in table 1, are the ones I focus 







 GENERAL FORMULA 




((1 − 𝛽)2 + 𝛽2)
)𝑆𝑖𝑆𝑗 
 
In table 1, β represents the ownership, in percentage of shares owned, while S is the market 
share of the acquiring firm i, and the acquired firm j. Silent financial interest represents a case 
of no control rights but the acquiring firm still has a right to β of the profits, and when this is 
the case, the acquiring firm’s incentives change, but not the acquired firm. The proportional 
control scenario is when the managers of the acquiring firm take their shareholders’ interests in 
other firms into account. The weight put on each shareholders’ interest is directly linked with 
the shareholders’ proportion to their financial interests in the acquired firm. There is a linear 
one-to-one relationship between ownership and control. In other words, if Firm i owns a 20 
percent stake in Firm j, then Firm j will make pricing and output decisions as if they had a 20 
percent stake in Firm i (Salop & O’Brien, p. 583). This scenario is relevant when there are 
competitors with financial interests in the same companies. Table 1 shows the formulas I have 
used to derive the MHHI-delta values in my analyses. The proportional control formula will 
always yield higher MHHI-delta values than the silent financial interest assumption, and one 
would therefore expect the price effects to be greater as well, as the theory predicts that greater 
values of MHHI-delta will lead to higher prices. 
The empirical question I aim to answer in this paper is whether cross-ownership, measured by 
the MHHI-delta affects the price of books after controlling for the HHI and other determinants. 
If the delta does not show any effect in my analysis, then the empirical tests will support the 
null hypothesis. 
H0: Cross-ownership, measured by MHHI-delta does not affect the prices 
Should however the delta be shown to have an impact, then the test will support the alternative 
hypothesis. 
H1: Cross-ownership, measured by MHHI-delta has a positive effect on the price level. 
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I check using both the proportional control assumption, and the silent financial interest 
assumption. If H1 holds, then the proportional control assumption will show the greatest effect, 
as higher an increase in the MHHI-delta is expected to yield higher prices. 
 
3 Data 
The data used in the analysis is from 2007-2019 with annual observations.  I use time series 
with price, MHHI-delta, HHI, average income, population unemployment rates, and streaming 
application revenue data throughout the period. I have used the shareholder register from 2007 
to 2019 in order to find the cross-ownership for each year in the time frame. This shows the 
ownership share of the firms in competitors during each year in the period. In addition to this I 
have used the yearly published industry statistics, “Bransjestatistikk” from 
“Forleggerforeningen” in order to find each firm’s net-turnover in each year. The four biggest 
publishers as of 2019 are; Gyldendal, Cappelen Damm, Aschehoug and Vigmostad & Bjørke. 
All the mentioned firms have had some ownership changes in the time frame. Vigmostad & 
Bjørke and Cappelen Damm by mergers/acquisitions, while Gyldendal and Aschehoug have 
had cross-ownership changes. I have also used the industry statistics to determine the market 
shares. My market is therefore defined as the members of Forleggerforeningen. The reader 
should keep in mind that this does not cover the entire publishing market, and my data and 
results are therefore somewhat limited in this regard. According to Oslo Economics (2011) 
members of Forleggerforeningen covered 70,7 percent of the overall book sales in 2010. 
Furthermore, one of the bigger companies in the industry, Vigmostad & Bjørke, was not a part 
of Forleggerforeningen from 2017. My data on them from 2017 to 2019 is therefore an estimate, 
based on articles stating their change in turnover from the previous year (BOK365, 2018) 
(Bergens Tidende, 2019) (E24, 2020). In this time-period, I have added their estimated net-
turnover to the overall number stated by Forleggerforeningen between 2017-2019 and then 
calculated each firm’s market share from this. My price data is also from the industry statistics, 
and it is a measure of the average book price in a given year. 
Another thing the reader should keep in mind, is that firms with a net-turnover below 10 million 
NOK in a year is not reported in the statistic, hence smaller firms are not included in the 
analysis. Therefore, if a firm owned by one of the panel firms has a net turnover below 10 
million NOK a year, its net turnover, and therefore its impact, is assumed to be 0 in the analysis. 
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Any ownership above 90% is assumed to be a complete acquisition, and all the acquired firm’s 
profits is included in the panel firm’s profits and market share. For instance, since Aschehoug 
own 100% of Universitetsforlaget, all of Universitetsforlaget’s profits are included in 
Aschehoug’s.  
Ownership between 1-90% is assumed to be cross-ownership. This is not included in the firms’ 
profit, or the market share, but rather in the MHHI-delta variable. I disregard ownership below 
1% and assume that it does not affect incentives or market outcomes. Tables 2 and 3 show 
Gyldendal’s and Aschehoug’s partial ownership interests throughout the period, these two firms 
have far more cross-ownership than the others in the market, as their rivals have tended to opt 
for complete buy-outs or mergers. 
Table 2: 
Year Bestselgerforlaget Lydbokforlaget Kunnskapsforlaget 
2007 0 0.25 0.5 
2008 0 0.33 0.5 
2009 0 0.33 0.5 
2010 0.5 0.33 0.5 
2011 0.5 0.33 0.5 
2012 0.5 0.33 0.5 
2013 0.5 0.33 0.5 
2014 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2015 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2016 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2017 0.5 0.5 0.5 
2018 0 0.5 1 
2019 0 0.5 1 









Year Bestselgerforlaget Lydbokforlaget Kunnskapsforlaget Spektrum 
2007 0 0.25 0.5 0 
2008 0 0.33 0.5 0.6 
2009 0 0.33 0.5 0.6 
2010 0.5 0.33 0.5 0.6 
2011 0.5 0.33 0.5 0.6 
2012 0.5 0.33 0.5 0.6 
2013 0.5 0.33 0.5 0.6 
2014 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 
2015 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 
2016 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
2017 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
2018 1 0.5 0 1 
2019 1 0.5 0 0 
Table 3 shows Aschehougs ownership interests in rivals throughout the period. 
 
In the analysis, I use the market shares in order to find the HHI, and then calculate the MHHI-
delta values assuming silent financial interests (no control rights), and proportional control 
(linear one-to-one relationship between ownership and control) using the formulas in table 1. 
As the market shares enter in both the HHI and the MHHI-delta, one should be aware of 
potential endogeneity issues which could bias the coefficient. If for instance, two firms own 
50% in a competitor, and one of them correctly predicts an increase in firm profitability, and 
that firm proceeds to buy out the other firm, this will reduce the MHHI-delta, but increase the 
regular HHI, we see this during the last few years of my dataset. This might lead to a negative 
relationship between the MHHI-delta and the profit margins. Figure 1 shows the HHI and the 
MHHI values throughout the period. There are two MHHI lines, the green assumes silent 
financial interests, and the red assumes proportional control. The difference between the blue 








Figure 1 shows the market concentration values on the y-axis, and the year on the x-axis. The 
HHI increased a lot in 2008 following the merger of Cappelen and Damm. After that it remained 
somewhat steady for a while. It then increased further after Vigmostad & Bjørke bought 
Schibsted in 2015. It has remained above 0.18 since 2017, showing an increase of more than 
500 since the beginning of the period. The MHHI with silent financial interests shows a very 
similar patterns, but with somewhat larger values. The two have a 92,8% correlation. The 
MHHI with proportional control rights also shows a similar pattern, but peaks in 2013, rather 
than 2017, and it has a correlation of 0.833 with the HHI. This is likely due to Lydbokforlaget, 
Spektrum, and Kunnskapsforlaget, all going from being cross-owned to being fully acquired 
after 2016. The MHHI-delta with the proportional control assumption, and the HHI have a 
correlation of -0.216, while the MHHI-delta with the silent financial interest assumption and 
the HHI have a correlation of -0.185.  
The industry statistic also shows an estimate of the average price for a book in each genre, each 
year. Forleggerforeningen do however admit that these are mere estimates, and that one should 
not take these numbers for granted. Another problem of the price estimates is that they are an 
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price index, I have found the inflation adjusted price each year in 2007 NOK (SSB, 2021c). 
This is shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2: 
 
From figure 2 it is clear that when adjusting for inflation, the average price for a book in Norway 
has declined a significant amount. From 170kr in 2007 to 134kr in 2019, which is more than a 
20% price reduction. This reduction is likely a result of market changes. According to 
Bransjestatistikk (2019) the demand for books in paper format has remained around the same, 
or declined slightly in the past few years, while the demand for book streaming has increased 
massively. This is cheaper to produce, and followingly the price falls. In order to control for 
this, I have included the revenues of the two biggest book streaming firms in Norway, Fabel 
and Storytel. I control for their combined profits. 
We now look at the price and MHHI-delta correlations. The price and the MHHI-delta when 
assuming proportional control rights have a 35% correlation, which does not necessarily 
indicate a causal relationship between the two as large correlations do not always mean causal 
relationships. Meanwhile, the lagged MHHI-delta has a 50% correlation with the book prices. 
As this is higher, it could be interpreted as an indication of prices following cross-ownership 
increases about a year later. Though again, the relationship cannot be interpreted as causal, and 
additional analyses are needed. The MHHI-delta when assuming silent financial interests shows 
very similar correlations, which makes sense as the β (ownership) and market shares are the 
same under the two assumptions. As a result, the MHHI-delta under the two assumptions show 
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changes. As we regress the price on the MHHI-delta, which is the difference between the MHHI 
and the HHI, figure 3 shows how the MHHI-delta changes throughout the period. 
Figure 3: 
 
As control variables I have included the average income (Pedersen, 2021), population (SSB, 
2021a), unemployment rate (FN, 2021). Finally, I have included a “streaming” variable which 
shows the revenues of Storytel and Fabel to control for the increase in audio book demand 
(Proff.no).  
In the dataset, the turnover is given in 1000 NOK, ownership in rivals and market share between 
is 0 and 1, prices are in 2007 NOK, streaming app revenues are in 10 Million NOK, 
unemployment rate is given in percentage, while population is rounded to the nearest thousand, 
and average income to the nearest 100. The reader should keep this in mind when interpreting 
the coefficients in the below regressions. 
 
4 Empirical methodology and results 
The aim of this section is to estimate the price effects of changes in cross-ownership, and show 
how I would recommend someone analyzing cross-ownership in the future to proceed. I also 
check to see if I find effects on the total market turnover resulting from cross-ownership 
changes.  I first use a time-series with the proportional control assumption when estimating the 
MHHI-delta for the industry statistic as a whole, and control for the market concentration, the 
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proceed to do the same analysis, but this time I use a one-year lagged MHHI-delta and HHI, as 
the price effects might not follow cross-ownership changes instantly. As spurious correlations 
might occur, I repeat the analysis, but I also include a time trend variable. I then follow up with 
a similar regression, but using the silent financial interest assumption, as theory predicts that 
this effect will be smaller, but yet increase the price slightly. In both analyses I find that the 
MHHI-delta has a coefficient, but no statistical significance is found.  
I then regress the MHHI-delta on the overall market turnover to see if it is affected by cross-
ownership changes. Nor here do we find any effects resulting from cross-ownership changes. 
I proceed to discuss the limitations of my analysis, and attempt alternative regressions which 
might help control for these issues. I also regress the price on the MHHI-delta with one lead, to 
make sure that increases in prices follows increases in cross-ownership, and not the other way 
round. 
As cross-ownership is expected to mainly cause anticompetitive effects in concentrated 
markets, I also do the analysis in a highly concentrated submarket, to see if the effects are 
stronger. Lastly, I do a panel data analysis where I include five different submarkets. As this 
does not cover all book genres, this analysis is limited, but it illustrates how future analyses 
should be done in order to acquire more reliable results.  
In the first specifications, I use time-series to regress the natural logarithm of the estimated 
average price in 2007 NOK at time t on MHHI-delta, HHI and additional controls: 
19) ln(𝑝𝑡) = 𝛽1𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼 ∆𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑡 + 𝑡 
Where pt is the average book price at time t, MHHIΔt is the MHHI-delta at time t, and Xt are 
control variables at time t. 
I show the results with the proportional control assumption in table 4, and with the assumption 
of silent financial interests in table 5. I also run the analysis with a one-year lag on the MHHI-
delta and the HHI. A limitation with the analysis is that I only have 13 observations. The results 
can therefore not be taken for granted as representational of the real situation, but rather used 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price 
MHHIΔ 1.742 3.073** 3.228   
 (1.573) (0.671) (2.136)   
      
MHHIΔ, one 
year lag 
   5.024* 4.141* 
    (1.786) (1.304) 
      
HHI -2.602** 0.863 0.885 -1.321  
 (0.535) (0.769) (0.926) (1.283)  
      
HHI, one year 
lag 
    -0.530 
     (0.354) 
      
Log income  -2.558* -2.586 -2.710* -1.573 
  (0.858) (1.135) (0.712) (0.832) 
      
Log population  5.732 5.759 5.794* 2.683 
  (2.678) (3.074) (2.191) (2.647) 
      
Unemployment 
rate 
 0.0485 0.0504 0.0322 0.0404 
  (0.0249) (0.0319) (0.0237) (0.0266) 
      
Streaming app 
revenues 
  0.000194 0.00309 0.00172 
   (0.00205) (0.00251) (0.00146) 
N 13 13 13 12 12 
r2 0.430 0.935 0.935 0.963 0.964 
r2_a 0.316 0.888 0.870 0.918 0.920 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Table 4 estimates the price effects of cross-ownership when the MHHI-delta is derived by using the proportional 
control formula shown in table 1. The regression is a time series in the period 2007-2019. 
Table 4 shows how the book price is affected by changes in cross-ownership, market 
concentration, average income, population changes, unemployment rate, and the revenues of 
the audio book apps, Storytel and Fabel. One thing to keep in mind when analyzing these results 
is that we have defined the HHI to range between 0 and 1. Therefore, in regression (1) in table 
4 the MHHI-delta cannot increase by one, and therefore the price will not increase by more than 
100%. Rather, if we look at the lowest to the largest delta-values, the difference is 0.0264. This 
change would implicate a price increase of 4,6% according to column 1. That said, regression 
(1) is not statistically significant, and it clearly suffers from omitted variable bias. Column 2 
likely performs better in this regard, as we have introduced control variables that might also 
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have an impact on the price. The price effect of cross-ownership is statistically significant at a 
1%-level. This time, moving from the lowest delta-value to the highest is assumed to increase 
the prices by 9,7%. In recent years however streaming apps like Fabel (created in 2017) and 
Storytel (created in 2015) have entered the market. Subscribers can listen to as many of the 
available book as they want for a monthly fee. This is generally cheaper than buying books, and 
I expect this to be one of the main drivers behind the big price decrease shown in figure 2. In 
columns 3-5, their yearly revenues are controlled for. In column 3 the price effect of cross-
ownership is no longer statistically significant. As the potential gains from acquiring ownership 
in a competitor might not be instant, I have also included a one-year lag for the MHHI-delta 
and the HHI to see if this better explains the price changes. The fourth column includes the 
MHHI-delta lag. The price-effect of cross-ownership is now assumed to be far stronger, and 
moving from the lowest delta-value to the highest is now expected to increase the price of a 
book by 13,3%. When also including the lagged HHI we see a similar, but somewhat smaller 
effect, and the delta is statistically significant at a 5%-level in both instances., which indicates 
a price-effect of cross-ownership changes, but is not conclusive. The statistical significance 
with few observations, might also be an indication of the analysis picking up spurious 
correlations. 
The perhaps most surprising result in table 4 is that the HHI does not appear to have an effect 
on the price. Furthermore, increased average income is associated with cheaper books when 
prices are adjusted for inflation, which could mean that the average income has increased more 
than the inflation during the period, the income has at least increased more than book prices. 
Population growth results in higher prices, potentially due to increased demand, and the 
unemployment rate does not appear to have an effect. However, as there is a very limited 
number of observations, n=13, the results are more of an indication of what influences the book 
price, rather than a conclusive answer, and the reader should keep this in mind.  With few 
observations and control variables, the regression could be picking up common trends rather 
than causal relationships. In column 1 for instance, the HHI is likely negative since the inflation 
adjusted price drops, while the market concentration increases throughout the time period. In 
addition to this, as Elhauge (2020) points out, overlapping ownership is, just as mergers, mainly 
anticompetitive if the market is highly concentrated, that is, if the HHI is more than 2000. This 
is not the case in any of the years in my analysis. Lastly, a potential issue is the market 
definition. I have defined the market as the firms in Forleggerforeningen, but this may be too 
broad, as many of the firms sell books in different genres. For instance, assuming that 
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elementary school books and novels are part of the same market might be farfetched. Later I 
attempt to correct the two latter issues, by regressing only in a submarket, cheap books, which 
is a submarket where the HHI ranges between 1900 and 2700 during the period. 
We now attempt the same regression, however, we include a time trend independent variable, 
to attempt to control for common changes through time across the variables. This is shown in 
table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price 
MHHIΔ 1.012 2.658 2.974   
 (0.967) (2.304) (2.278)   
      
MHHIΔ, one 
year lag 
   5.044 3.717 
    (2.118) (1.368) 
      
HHI -0.320 0.794 0.801 -1.721  
 (0.601) (1.031) (1.032) (1.527)  
      
HHI, one year 
lag 
    -0.854 
     (0.363) 
      
Time trend -0.0129** -0.00953 0.0674 -0.115 -0.154 
 (0.00364) (0.0417) (0.0483) (0.0886) (0.112) 
      
Log income  -2.465 -2.4101 -2.703* -1.011 
  (1.266) (1.3803) (0.830) (0.984) 
      
Log population  6.346*  14.75 13.16 
  (2.137)  (6.574) (6.632) 
      
Unemployment 
rate 
 0.0447 0.0439 0.0447 0.0614 
  (0.0286) (0.0354) (0.0281) (0.0269) 
      
Streaming app 
revenues 
  0.00356 0.00946 0.00961 
   (0.00205) (0.00621) (0.00614) 
N 13 13 13 12 12 
r2 0.747 0.935 0.939 0.970 0.974 
r2_a 0.663 0.870 0.852 0.917 0.930 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.1 shows that when including a time trend, neither the MHHI-delta or the HHI are 
statistically significant in any of the regressions. It is likely that table 4 picked up common 
trends across time. Hence, table 4.1 likely outperforms table 4, as I believe we have now 
controlled for spurious correlations. Due to the limited number of observations, it also seems 
reasonable to not find a statistically significant effect. An issue with adding an additional 
control variable with few observations is that the degrees of freedom will be reduced even more. 
Removing some of the other control variables might be beneficial in this regard. In column 3, I 
removed the population variable to adjust for this. Again, none of the effects were statistically 
significant. As I believe table 4.1 outperforms table 4, I proceed by including the time trend 
variable in the next specifications. 
In table 5, I do the same analysis, but we now assume silent financial interests, so the partial 
owners have no control rights. By relaxing the control assumption, we can ensure robustness. 
The variation of the share to control ratio yields an important placebo test. Theory predicts that 
when assuming no control rights, the anticompetitive effects should be smaller, but still apply, 
as shown in section 2.2.3 This is meant as a validity check, as I would expect smaller 


















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price 
MHHIΔ 2.809 7.423 9.320   
 (2.782) (6.841) (7.170)   
      
MHHIΔ, one 
year lag 
   14.51 11.39 
    (6.606) (4.140) 
      
HHI -0.352 0.701 0.677 -1.450  
 (0.614) (1.030) (1.151) (1.529)  
      
HHI, one year 
lag 
    -0.928 
     (0.358) 
      
Time trend -0.0129** -0.0116 -0.0978 -0.0942 -0.148 
 (0.00366) (0.0430) (0.121) (0.0929) (0.108) 
      
Log income  -2.457 -2.418 -2.857* -1.155 
  (1.312) (1.417) (0.858) (0.907) 
      
Log population  6.528* 12.90 13.63 13.07 
  (2.118) (7.588) (6.997) (6.453) 
      
Unemployment 
rate 
 0.0440 0.0625 0.0377 0.0584 
  (0.0286) (0.0376) (0.0282) (0.0244) 
      
Streaming app 
revenues 
  0.00547 0.00810 0.00947 
   (0.00621) (0.00614) (0.00581) 
N 13 13 13 12 12 
r2 0.746 0.934 0.938 0.967 0.977 
r2_a 0.661 0.868 0.851 0.908 0.937 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Table 5 estimates the price effects of cross-ownership when the MHHI-delta is derived by using the silent financial 
interests formula shown in table 1. The regression is a time series in the period 2007-2019. 
It appears from the coefficients in tables 4 & 5 that cross-ownership has a positive effect on 
book prices, however as none of the MHHI-delta coefficients are statistically significant, we 
disregard this, and assume no effect. A somewhat surprising effect, which also indicates that 
the results are not robust, is that the MHHI-delta has a higher coefficient when assuming that 
the ownership comes with silent financial interests rather than with proportional control rights. 
This might be an indication of the previously mentioned spurious correlations being assumed 
to be causal in the analysis, however, after the inclusion of the time trend, the results are not 
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statistically significant. I question whether the one-year lag performs better than the MHHI-
delta without a lag. One year is quite a long time, and ideally, I would have monthly or quarterly 
data, and perform a Dickey-Fuller generalized least squares (DF-GLS) test, in an attempt to 
find the optimal number of lags. Even though quarterly data would be preferable, I do run a 
DF-GLS test, to find the optimal number of lags for the MHHI-delta, and find that under the 
NG-perron criterion, the optimal number of lags is 0 under the proportional control assumption, 
and 1 lag is optimal when assuming silent financial interests. Under the MAIC criterion, one 
lag is optimal under both MHHI-delta assumptions. I therefore stick to running the analyses 
with zero and one lag from this point. The inclusion of more lags will also reduce the number 
of observations even further. 
In most industries having a one-year lag on the price might be too much, and while this may 
still be the case in the book market, the fixed price system might make the one-year lag optimal 
as the initial price cannot be altered until May 1. the following year. How the fixed price and 
cross-ownership jointly impact the price decisions of publishers is interesting, but hard to 
measure. However, the lagged MHHI-delta might measure how cross-ownership impacts the 
price after the fixed price period is over, while the MHHI-delta with no lags indicates how the 
fixed price is impacted by cross-ownership, this might be especially relevant as most of the 
larger bookstores are owned, at least partially, by the big publishers, and they can keep making 
price decisions after the fixed price period is finished. If this is the case, then the above tables 
indicate that the pricing decisions are more impacted by cross-ownership after the fixed price 
period is over, as shown by the larger coefficients on the lagged MHHI-delta. However, as there 
be other reasons why the price effects are lagged, we cannot assume this to be the case, and the 
reader should be careful in this interpretation. 
I now check to see if the total market turnover is impacted by increases in cross-ownership. 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log market turnover Log market turnover Log market turnover Log market turnover 
Silent financial 
interests 
10.60    
 (8.895)    
  3.971   
Proportional 
control rights 
    
  (3.173)   
     
Silent with one 
lag 
  16.99  
   (7.821)  
     
Proportional with 
one lag 
   5.938 
    (2.580) 
     
HHI 1.250 1.420 -3.877* -4.201* 
 (1.716) (1.700) (1.345) (1.373) 
     
Log income -4.670 -4.735 -7.191** -7.014** 
 (1.938) (1.917) (1.454) (1.292) 
     
Log population 1.554 0.955 12.23 13.55 
 (11.10) (11.06) (9.896) (9.449) 
     
Unemployment 
rate 
0.0433 0.0452 0.00270 0.0110 
 (0.0574) (0.0548) (0.0388) (0.0379) 
     
Streaming app 
revenues 
-0.00436 -0.00449 0.00253 0.00417 
 (0.00937) (0.00912) (0.00938) (0.00935) 
     
Time trend 0.154 0.163 0.109 0.0848 
 (0.196) (0.195) (0.143) (0.136) 
N 13 13 12 12 
r2 0.888 0.891 0.964 0.968 
r2_a 0.730 0.739 0.901 0.912 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Table 6 estimates the market turnover effects of cross-ownership in the book market. The analysis uses time series 
in the period 2007-2019, and the MHHI-delta is derived using the proportional control, and the silent financial 
interests assumptions in table 1. 
Table 6 shows the overall net turnover effect of cross-ownership. Again, the lag in MHHI-delta 
shows a stronger effect, but it is not statistically significant. This indicates that the market 
turnover is not affected by cross-ownership changes. The counterintuitive result is again that 
the silent financial interest assumption has the highest effect on net-turnover, though as neither 
MHHI-delta coefficient is statistically significant, we disregard this. This time, it also appears 
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that an increase in the market concentration, shown by HHI, results in a lower market turnover. 
As an increase in HHI indicates fewer firms that can gain profits, this is not unbelievable. 
 
4.1 Results, robustness and discussion  
One cannot assert that the results are representational to the market as a whole due to the limited 
number of observations. Monthly or quarterly data would help greatly in this regard. 
Furthermore, the dataset is limited as I cannot control for market fixed effects, and my main 
specification is a time series rather than panel data. I only have a market average price, and not 
firm specific prices, as a result, I am unable to truly see how a firm’s partial ownership 
acquisition influences its price decisions. Thus far I have an estimate of how changes in the 
aggregate level of cross-ownership in the market influences the average price of a book, or the 
market turnover as a whole. Ideally, I would have panel data, which would allow controlling 
for market fixed effects. This would difference out potential omitted variable bias. The wide 
market definition is also a potential issue, as different book genres may not be considered to all 
be one market. Furthermore, the above analyses do not include HHI values above 2000, and 
while this may indicate that cross-ownership at the current point in time is not an issue in the 
publishing industry, the analysis does not help conclude whether or not cross-ownership results 
in anticompetitive outcomes in highly concentrated markets. Lastly, the perhaps most important 
thing to keep in mind when interpreting the results is that we might be picking up common 
trends. That is, if any of the control variables show a similar trend throughout the period to the 
price (decreasing), then this is picked up as a causal relationship, we need to be careful of such 
spurious correlations. Variables that increase throughout the period will have negative 
coefficients as their increase is assumed to cause the dependent variable to decrease. The time 
trend variable should help control for this. A panel regression on all different submarkets would 
however be beneficial, as the fixed effects would difference out the common trends. 
As previously mentioned, there are also potential endogeneity of market shares and ownership, 
as the market shares are picked up in both the MHHI-delta and in the regular HHI. Another 
thing is the potential for reverse causality as price changes might induce ownership changes, 





4.1.1 Reverse causality issues 
If prices cause increased cross-ownership, then the price increase should precede increases in 
cross-ownership. In table 4, I assumed that the prices followed cross-ownership, and the lag of 
MHHI-delta was positive and statistically significant at a 5%-level. I repeat the analysis in table 
7, but this time with the lead of MHHI-delta, under the proportional control assumption. 
Table 7: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log Price Log Price Log Price Log Price 
MHHIΔ with 
one lead 
-0.669 -1.853 -3.397 -2.149 
 (1.213) (2.245) (1.737) (1.005) 
     
HHI -2.398** -1.702 -0.592  
 (0.599) (1.754) (1.446)  
     
HHI with one 
lead 
   1.247 
    (1.079) 
     
Log income  1.409 -0.484 -0.889 
  (2.234) (1.989) (0.425) 
     
Log population  -5.466 1.245 2.079 
  (6.353) (6.010) (1.470) 
     
Unemployment 
rate 
 0.0440 -0.00925  
  (0.0282) (0.0316)  
     
Audio book 
revenues 
  -0.00616 -0.00578* 
   (0.00268) (0.00172) 
N 12 12 12 12 
r2 0.438 0.808 0.920 0.924 
r2_a 0.313 0.648 0.824 0.861 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Table 7 tests if changes in the price level might induce cross-ownership changes, rather than vice versa. The 
analysis uses time series in the period 2007-2019, and the MHHI-delta is derived using the proportional control 
assumption in table 1. 
The coefficient on one lead of MHHI-delta is not statistically significant, furthermore it is now 
negative. The implication is that if anything, higher prices may actually reduce firms’ 
willingness to acquire partial ownership in rivals. However, as the results are not statistically 







4.1.2 Data limitations 
As I have had to gather all the data on my own from public sources, the analysis is limited to 
13 observations, more observations will usually yield more reliable estimates. In addition, 
Forleggerforeningen does not include the whole publishing market. Should someone at a later 
point wish to examine the impacts of cross-ownership on competition in the publishing industry, 
these would however be one of the easier issues to rectify. I was unable to gain access monthly 
or quarterly data, so my control variables are limited to annual observations which prevents me 
from controlling for seasonal changes. Furthermore, the only variables I have that vary between 
firms, are their net turnover (and consequentially their market shares), and their partial 
ownership in competitors. Someone doing the analysis in the future should find a price estimate 
for each book genre. That way, one can do a panel analysis with fixed market effects.  
 
4.1.3 Endogeneity issues 
The MHHI-delta itself possesses a potential issue, since it is a function of both cross-ownership, 
and market shares. Therefore, when the coefficient is statistically significant, we cannot 
conclude that there is a causal relationship between increased cross-ownership and a price 
increase. The shifts in figure 1 shows definite changes in the market shares of at least some of 
the firms. The negative correlation between the MHHI-delta and HHI is however a good 
indication that this is not a huge issue. Nevertheless, the reader should be aware of this when 
interpreting the results, though, according to Elhauge (2020), this only lowers the coefficient 
relative to its actual value, and rectifying this will lead to cross-ownership showing a bigger 
effect on the price. To try to counter this, I follow Torshizi & Clapp (2019) and apply each 
firm’s average market share throughout the period when calculating the MHHI-delta. This way, 
changes in market shares are not captured by both the HHI and the MHHI-delta. If the MHHI-
delta is statistically significant, one can now be more certain that it is due to changes in cross-
ownership and not variations in market shares. There will be limitations due to the limited 
number of observations, potential omitted variables and the not controlling for fixed market 
effects. In table 8, I repeat the analysis done in table 4, however, this time I have used each 
firm’s (acquirer and acquired) average market share throughout the period when computing the 
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MHHI-delta. The delta values therefore vary a lot less than previously as changes in market 
shares are not accounted for. 
 
Table 8: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log price Log price Log price Log price Log price 
MHHIΔ 2.034 -0.986 -1.141   
 (1.104) (1.838) (1.999)   
      
MHHIΔ, one 
year lag 
   -5.627 -0.778 
    (3.191) (2.121) 
      
HHI -0.627 0.264 0.192 -3.883  
 (0.751) (0.991) (1.227) (2.707)  
      
HHI, one year 
lag 
    -1.122 
     (0.937) 
      
Time Trend -0.0129** -0.0796 -0.135 -0.252 -0.201 
 (0.00320) (0.0382) (0.162) (0.157) (0.117) 
      
Log income  -1.578 -1.435 -5.801 -1.086 
  (0.880) (1.143) (2.101) (1.976) 
      
Log population  10.12 14.01 37.76 18.34 
  (4.683) (11.23) (17.42) (8.859) 
      
Unemployment 
rate 
 0.0311 0.0393 0.00153 0.0503 
  (0.0274) (0.0436) (0.0315) (0.0424) 
      
Streaming app 
revenues 
  0.00290 0.00652 0.00724 
   (0.00795) (0.00825) (0.00619) 
N 13 13 13 12 12 
r2 0.805 0.927 0.929 0.952 0.945 
r2_a 0.740 0.855 0.829 0.869 0.849 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Table 8 estimates the price effects of cross-ownership in the book market. The analysis uses time series in the 
period 2007-2019, and the MHHI-delta is derived using the proportional control assumption in table 1, with an 
average market share throughout the period 
In table 8, neither the HHI or the MHHI-delta coefficients are statistically significant. In other 
words, table 8 indicates that the results from tables 4 & 5 were suffering from endogeneity as 
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the MHHI-delta has negative coefficients. This result stands in contrast to Elhauge’s (2020) 
prediction that the coefficient would be higher when eliminating the market share variation. If 
the error term is correlated with market shares, we have limited this variation to the HHI. An 
issue however is that the MHHI-delta varies a lot less, resulting in even more limited number 
of observations, as we now only have six different values for the MHHI-delta. In many of the 
analyses done so far, the effects of cross-ownership seem to have a positive effect on the price 
level, until controlling for the streaming application revenues. Considering that n=13 at most, 
it seems somewhat unlikely that we can find effects statistically significant at a 5%-level. 
Controlling for the streaming application revenues changes the coefficients. This might be due 
to the streaming revenues being a main driver behind the price fall (Forleggerforeningen, 2019), 
and the inclusion of it might remove a lot of omitted variable bias, and also helps correcting for 
common trends being assumed to be causal relationships. As figure 2 shows, the price drop was 
especially strong from 2015, the year Storytel was introduced. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant, and based on this analysis, we cannot determine that the introduction 
of streaming apps has affected the price. The inclusion of several control variables with few 
observations does however reduce the degrees of freedom, which might be an issue here as 
well. 
Another issue with table 8 is that anticompetitive effects might depend on the interaction 
between current market shares and the cross-ownership. Should that be the case, then the results 
might underestimate the price effect. However, that might also be beneficial as it might shed 
light on the minimum effect of cross-ownership. Though in table 8, that minimum effect is 
shown to be no effect. Still, it is important to note that in the publishing market, cross-ownership 
might not have anticompetitive effects, perhaps because the market is not highly concentrated 
(HHI<2000). Though again, this might be due to the market definition being too wide, or the 
limited number of observations not yielding market representative results. Regardless, based on 
this analysis, there is no reason for competition authorities to intervene in the publishing 
industry due to anticompetitive effects arising from cross-ownership. 
4.1.4 Market definition and concentration concerns 
We now address the issues regarding cross-ownership primarily being anticompetitive in highly 
concentrated markets. As mergers are often not considered anticompetitive if the market is 
unconcentrated, the same has to be true for cross-ownership, as the anticompetitive effects of 
the acquisition of partial ownership in one competitor, can never be larger than those of mergers. 
We also address the issue with the market definition used in the previous analyses being too 
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wide as a price increase in educational books is unlikely to increase demand for fiction, in other 
words, it is unlikely that all books can be considered close substitutes to each other. In this 
section, I narrow the market definition, and look at one submarket in Forleggerforeningen, 
cheap books (pocket books etc.). The advantage of this is that we now have a more precise 
market definition, and one where the HHI is above 2000 throughout most of the period. The 
HHI in this submarket only drops below 2000 in three of the years in the period, in which the 
HHI is between 1500 and 2000. This better indicates the effects of cross-ownership increases 
in a highly concentrated market. I was not able to acquire the data from 2007 in this submarket, 
so this analysis is a time-series from 2008 to 2019.  
Table 9: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log Price Log Price Log Price Log Price Log Price 
MHHIΔ 2.833* 3.004 2.450   
 (1.067) (1.407) (1.634)   
      
MHHIΔ, one 
year lag 
   0.665 -1.832 
    (2.943) (1.599) 
      
HHI 1.288 1.591 -0.271 -4.075  
 (1.113) (1.182) (2.098) (6.043)  
      
HHI, one year 
lag 
    -0.408 
     (1.604) 
      
Time trend -0.00193 -0.00118 -0.746 -1.494 -0.160 
 (0.0129) (0.0564) (0.737) (1.758) (0.614) 
      
Log 
population 
 -18.95 33.22 95.15 24.46 
  (14.25) (54.28) (101.8) (39.07) 
      
Log income  6.239 7.747 5.383 -4.465 
  (4.093) (4.697) (11.40) (6.891) 
      
Unemployme
nt rate 
 0.101 0.176 0.202 0.00537 
  (0.0961) (0.110) (0.184) (0.165) 
      
Streaming app 
revenues 
  0.0404 0.0815 0.00743 
   (0.0381) (0.0969) (0.0321) 
N 12 12 12 11 11 
r2 0.481 0.685 0.716 0.710 0.641 
r2_a 0.286 0.306 0.220 0.0321 -0.195 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 9 estimates the price effects of cross-ownership in a highly concentrated submarket, cheap books. The 
analysis uses time series in the period 2007-2019, and the MHHI-delta is derived using the proportional control 
assumption in table 1. 
Table 9 shows similar results as the previous analyses. Except for column 1, none of the 
coefficients are statistically significant, and we cannot dismiss H0, that cross-ownership 
impacts the price, even in a concentrated market. This indicates that increases in cross-
ownership, in highly concentrated markets, has no significant effects on the price level. If the 
MHHI-delta were to increase by 0.0557 (which is the difference between the highest and the 
lowest MHHI-delta values in this market), the price would be expected to increase by about 
14% according the column 3 in table 9. This is a huge price effect, and one that would harm 
consumer welfare. However, as the results are not statistically significant, we disregard this, 
and based on this analysis, do not assume that cross-ownership changes will impact price 
decisions. The reader should however, still keep in mind that many of the previous limitations 
remain. Particularly perhaps the observation limitations, and the fact that we have time-series 
rather than panel data which would help with omitted variable bias.  
The MHHI-delta effect on prices in tables 4-9 might also have a common flaw, which results 
in the coefficient being too low. A common feature of the MHHI-delta in all the analyses done 
so far is that they assume that each firm acts independently. If several of the panel firms have 
their interests aligned, then the true cross-ownership concentration would be higher than the 
MHHI-delta value measures (Torshizi & Clapp, 2019). In the publishing industry, it does not 
seem unlikely that Aschehoug and Gyldendal have common interests as they have a lot of joined 
ventures. A strategy that yields higher returns for one of the firms, will yield higher returns for 
the other. In addition to this, their combined market share is above 40% in some years, meaning 
a price increase from the two would be very significant, and would likely incentivize other firms 
to also charge a higher price, as their demand would increase following their rivals’ price 
increase.  
The above regressions have all assumed that the amount of control is proportional to the 
ownership, or non-existent. However, the amount of control a firm can exercise over a partially 
owned firm, is not something that the percentage of shares necessarily implies. An exact 
measure of this cannot be computed, and it will naturally have consequences on the MHHI-
delta values. Depending on the governance structure of the acquired firm, the amount of control 




Some of the regressions done so far do, to a limited extent, support the theoretical literature. 
Specifically, the regression done with a lag on MHHI-delta in table 4 shows anticompetitive 
effects of increases in cross-ownership. The validity of these results is however questioned by 
the fact that the MHHI-delta coefficient when assuming silent financial interests is higher than 
when assuming proportional control rights. This defies theory, intuition, and previous results. 
In addition to this, the inclusion of the time trend variable eliminates this statistical significance. 
 
4.2 Preferred specification 
The limitations are, as previously mentioned, in part due to most of my data being from 
Forleggerforeningen’s Bransjestatistikk (2007-2019), and it does not contain all the information 
necessary to do a panel regression, particularly the information regarding each separate book 
genre is limited as they only include a few of the biggest publishers in each category. As the 
cross-ownership is mainly big publishers having partial ownership in smaller ones, I have 
missing data. I believe the ideal way to do the analysis would be to use the time period I have 
used as the time variable, however, the panel variable should have been book genres, to 
differentiate between separate markets. This way I could have done the analysis with a price 
estimate for each book genre. I would also have the aggregate MHHI-delta, and the HHI in each 
submarket throughout the period. As a control variable, the aggregate turnover in each market 
segment could also have been included. Equation 20) shows how I would have preferred to 
regress, and how I would recommend someone analyzing in the future to do it. 
20) ln(𝑝𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽1𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 
Equation 20) is similar to 18), but it now includes the market fixed effects, where pit is the price 
of book genre i at time t, and so forth. The equation now also contains gi which represents the 
market fixed effects (book genres).   
Potentially one could control for both the market and the publisher, shown by equation 21) 
21) ln(𝑝𝑖𝑓𝑡) = 𝛽1𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐼∆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑓𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑓 + 𝑖𝑓𝑡 
where pift is the average price of publisher f in book genre i at time t. Equation 20) is an 
aggregated version of equation 21), and gif  are 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑥 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟 fixed effects.  
The industry statistics do not include the firm specific prices, so equation 21) was not an 
analysis I could do. I do however attempt to run the regression from 20), but again, the reader 
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should keep in mind that the information regarding each genre is limited compared to the overall 
statistics. Another thing is that I was unable to obtain the genre specific information from 2007, 
so the below analysis is between 2008-2019. Therefore, the big jump in market concentration 
due to the merger of Cappelen and Damm, is not accounted for. In the analysis I have included 
ownership between 1% and 95% as partial cross-ownership. 
The data for each of the individual market segments does not include publishers with a turnover 
of less than 5 MNOK in a particular year. In some submarkets, this accounts for more than 20% 
of the total turnover. This throws off the HHI and the MHHI-delta values, as the estimates will 
be too low.  
Another thing to keep in mind, is that Vigmostad & Bjørke left Forleggerforeningen in 2017, 
and I was not able to find their turnover in each of the different market segments after this 
period. Therefore, the HHI values from 2017 to 2019 will also be somewhat inaccurate.  
The panel data uses five submarkets, from 2008 to 2019.  The five book genres used as the 
submarkets are, non-fiction, translated non-fiction, fiction, books for higher education, and 
cheap books (books in pocket format). I have used the industry statistics estimated price for 
each of these book types throughout the period, and deflated the price to 2007 NOK. 
Furthermore, I have calculated the HHI and the MHHI-delta for the genres in each year during 
the period. The MHHI-delta values are constructed using the proportional control assumption. 
Both of these numbers vary vastly between submarkets.  
When doing a panel data analysis, each of the included submarkets need to have some common 
correlations, to be considered a market, and for the analysis to be fruitful. For instance, demand 
fluctuations might be correlated with the average income across all markets. Cheap books might 
have increased demand as a result of reduced income, and it is possible that this is negatively 
correlated with income, however, if the fluctuations change approximately at the same time, 
following the income changes, the correlations are stable. Another possible correlation which 
might impact prices similarly across submarkets might be taxation. Nationwide income taxation 
policies might impact the publishers pricing decisions, and the effect of this is likely similar 
across all submarkets.  
The lowest HHI value is 0.0694, which indicates a very unconcentrated market, and healthy 
competition. This is in the non-fiction category. The highest HHI value found is the educational 
books for higher education category, and is 0.3551, indicating a highly concentrated market. 
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The MHHI-delta also varies a lot. In the books for higher education there is no cross-ownership 
throughout the period. Meanwhile, in the fiction category, it goes as high as 0.1555. 
 
Table 10: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log Price Log Price Log Price Log Price 
MHHIΔ 0.756  0.685  
 (0.406)  (0.488)  
     
HHI 0.284 0.316   
 (0.367) (0.308)   
     
MHHIΔ with 
one lag 
 -1.142**  -1.173** 
  (0.231)  (0.229) 
     
HHI with one lag   0.361 0.0858 
   (0.686) (0.415) 
N 60 55 55 55 
r2 0.0613 0.142 0.0527 0.126 
r2_a 0.0283 0.109 0.0162 0.0925 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
Table 10 estimates the price effects of cross-ownership in a panel data regression, using five submarkets in the 
time period 2008-2019. The MHHI-delta is derived by using the proportional control assumption given in table 1. 
When regressing the price on the MHHI-delta, and the HHI, the results are not statistically 
significantly different from zero. In other words, cross-ownership does not appear to have an 
effect on prices. The only statistically significant coefficients in table 10, are the lagged delta 
values, which are in fact negative. Implying that an increase in cross-ownership is associated 
with lower prices. This seems unlikely, and is likely proof of the model not being accurate. 
However, Lopes and Vives (2019) show that increases in overlapping ownership might lead to 
spillover effects which in fact increase consumer surplus, if certain criteria are met. They point 
to R&D investments reducing firms’ costs, and if one such firm has ownership in a rival this 
might spillover to that rival. As a result, both firms have lowers costs, and can increase output 
or reduce the price. They point out that this is especially prevalent in highly innovative sectors. 
However, the book market is unlikely to be considered highly innovative. With the exception 
of audio books, the market has remained the same throughout the period. Unfortunately, the 
audio book submarket was one of many that were not included in this analysis, showing that 
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table 10 suffers from data limitations. The analysis is however, a nice example of how future 
analyses should be done when studying cross-ownership in the publishing sector, with complete 
data. 
The fixed effects regression itself should difference out the omitted variables that are specific 
to each submarket. However, the data only includes five submarkets. The industry statistics 
show the average price, and market shares in 25 different submarkets. Unfortunately, including 
all these would be too time consuming, but if the competition authorities were to do this analysis 
in the future, the inclusion of all 25 submarkets, and their HHI and MHHI-delta values would 
be beneficial. In addition, a future analysis should not be limited to members of 
Forleggerforeningen, since this does not cover the entire market. Ideally, they would follow 
specification 21). As a control variable, one should add demand for streaming applications, 
since, according to Forleggerforeningen (Bransjestatistikk 2019, 2020), the demand for 
streaming has increased rapidly in the past few years, while the demand for regular books, has 
remained steady, or perhaps declined slightly. They point out that this has been a driver for 
reduced average prices. Controlling for this would likely yield more accurate results, as this is 
currently picked up in the error term, leading to estimation bias. I used the proportional control 
assumption from table 1 when estimating the MHHI-delta values, but as this demands the 
market share of both the acquiring and the acquired firm, I was unable to include book streaming 
in my panel regression. The only two publishers in the audio book submarket are 
Lydbokforlaget, and Cappelen Damm. Lydbokforlaget is owned by Gyldendal and Aschehoug, 
who own 50% each in the latter years of the period, but since they are not themselves listed in 
the industry statistics, I was unable to apply the formula from table 1 to find the MHHI-delta of 
this. Preferably, I would also have a demand variable to control for, as seeing the effects of 
demand on price would likely help with omitted variable bias. Instead, I have used the 
population, but this is not reliable replacement. By including a demand variable, I could find 
the price and quantity coefficients of demand. Dividing the demand’s output coefficient by the 
price coefficient would then give an estimate of the elasticity of demand. We would then see if 
demand fluctuations are driving price changes. The main problems however, is likely that the 
analysis only includes five of the 25 market segments, and that there might be omitted variables 
that apply to all the markets. This analysis and discussion, is meant as an example of how the 




5 Concluding remarks 
5.1 Legal grounds for intervention 
The Norwegian Competition Authorities accused the four biggest publishers in Norway of 
violating the Competition Law, a case which ended last year, following appeals. This case 
however, was not cross-ownership related. The publishers were accused of illegal exchange of 
information, and violating § 10 in the Norwegian Competition Law (krrl, § 10). In this section 
I discuss whether the publishing industry should be looked at again, in regards to cross-
ownership. An interesting feature of the Norwegian publishing industry is however related to 
exactly this. The publishers can set a fixed price which lasts until April 30. the following year. 
This means that they are excepted from § 10, as the publishers and the bookstores agree on a 
fixed price until the fixed price period ends. The Norwegian Competition Authorities have 
however, expressed a desire for this law to be revised, as they feel it leads to higher prices 
(Konkurransetilsynet, 2020). This exemption does not hold regarding horizontal 
communication, and it is for this they have been fined.   
I focus on European competition law, mainly Norwegian, which is made to hold the same rules. 
I discuss whether current EU competition laws provide grounds for authorities to intervene in 
markets with cross-ownership, and if so, under which terms. The Norwegian Competition Law 
is based on the EU law. I then discuss whether there is legal justification for the Norwegian 
Competition Authorities to intervene in the publishing sector. 
As previously mentioned, mergers and acquisitions (M & A’s) are always evaluated by the 
competition authorities. If they are considered to reduce the competitive pressure in the market, 
they will not be allowed. At the basis of the evaluation is whether or not the consumer welfare 
will be harmed, this is in accordance to the European Merger Regulation (EUMR). In addition 
to this, M & A’s can be stopped if the chances of tacit collusion are considered to increase 
following the M & A’s, even though tacit collusion itself is not illegal. EEA law is also strict 
in regards to collective dominance and excessive pricing when evaluating mergers. Collective 
dominance means that two or more firms in a market hold a dominant position. It makes it hard 
for rivals to compete, and if not regulated, the dominant firms can, for instance, easily drive 
them out with aggressive pricing (excessive pricing). Abusing a collective dominant position is 
prohibited by Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
These rules also apply to members of the EEA, and in Norway it falls under the Competition 
Law, Article 11. These articles are specific to abuse of dominance. When in a dominant 
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position, excessive pricing is also prohibited by TFEU, Article 102. When showing that M & 
A’s will have anticompetitive effects, as described in Article 102 of TFEU, the merger will not 
be allowed, due to EUMR, which in the Norwegian law of competition is stated in § 16 (krrl, 
2004, § 16). 
With the recent rise in discussions regarding the effects of overlapping ownership, the main 
topic is if such regulations should be implemented by antitrust authorities in regards to 
overlapping ownership, as they are for M & A’s. In the Norwegian competition law, § 16, it is 
stated that M & A’s that hinders effective competition are prohibited, especially if it creates, or 
enhances a dominant position. Furthermore, § 16 a clearly states that the acquisition of partial 
ownership will be blocked if it hinders effective competition, especially if it creates or enhances 
a dominant position, the same goes for increases in already existing partial ownership. The 
partial ownership is feared to reduce the incentives of the acquired firm and the partial owner 
to compete aggressively. It might also make it easier for the firms to exchange information, 
which is prohibited by § 10. Cross-ownership regulation is in other words in place. Whether or 
not common ownership should fall under the same set of rules is heavily debated, but that is out 
of the scope of this paper. 
In the Norwegian publishing industry cross-ownership is present. Table 2 and table 3 shows 
Gyldendal’s and Aschehoug’s partial ownership in rival publishers between 2007 and 2019. Of 
the big four publishing firms, which might gain dominance, these are the two firms with cross-
ownership. We see that the amount increased a lot until 2015. It then fell as they started to fully 
acquire the joint ventures. Bestselgerforlaget, Lydbokforlaget, and Kunnskapsforlaget were all 
owned by these two firms, and between 2014 and 2017 they had 50% each in all of them. This 
is still the case for Lydbokforlaget. As § 16 a in the Norwegian Law of Competition states that 
partial ownership is prohibited if it harms competition, it seems the Norwegian Competition 
Authorities have not considered cross-ownership changes in the Norwegian publishing industry 
to harm competition. Should it be found that the competition has been harmed, or will be in the 
future, they will intervene. Based on my analysis, there is no conclusive evidence of consumer 






5.2 Summary of regression results 
We have now looked at how cross-ownership influences the market, and we have performed 
robustness tests to check the validity of the results. We also illustrated how the analysis should 
be performed in the future, in the form of a panel regression. 
Column 2 in table 4 estimates that prices will increase with cross-ownership, and this result is 
statistically significant at a 1%-level. When including the streaming app revenues however, this 
effect is no longer statistically significant, except when using the lagged MHHI-delta. It seems 
reasonable that the price increase might not be instant following a partial acquisition in a rival. 
One interpretation could also be that the lag indicates the price effects after the bookstores are 
free to set their own price, and the MHHI-delta without lags estimates the fixed price effect of 
cross-ownership changes. Nevertheless, most of the regressions in table 4 estimates that cross-
ownership increases price levels, as theory predicts. As we have 13 observations, it is not 
surprising that none of the coefficients are statistically significant at a 0.1%-level. I then 
repeated the analysis, but this time I included a time trend variable, to control for potential 
spurious correlations. When including the time trend, none of the MHHI-delta variables were 
statistically significant. I also tested this in tables 5-9, and found similar outcomes, including a 
time trend removed the statistically significant results, as spurious correlations are better 
controlled for. 
Table 5 performs as the first robustness test. We now assume silent financial interests rather 
than proportional control when calculating the MHHI-delta. Theory would predict a smaller 
effect here than in table 4, as the acquirer has no control rights in the acquired firm. As expected, 
table 5 estimates that increases in cross-ownership leads to higher prices. Despite this, the 
analysis fails the first robustness test, as the effects are estimated to be far larger when assuming 
no control rights. This might be an indication that the regression is picking up common trends 
as causal effects, and this tells us that we cannot assume that the results in table 4 are 
representative for the anticompetitive effects of cross-ownership in the publishing industry. 
I then checked to see if cross-ownership impacts the overall market turnover. I checked under 
both control assumptions in table 1, and found no indication of any causal effects arising from 
cross-ownership. As cross-ownership might give some firms a more dominant position, this 
will come at the expense of competitors, so this seems plausible. 
The next analysis, shown in table 7 is an additional robustness test. As column 2 in table 4 
showed a positive price effect, we now check to see if the MHHI-delta with one lead is 
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statistically significant. If this were the case, then cross-ownership increases would be a result 
of price increases, rather than vice versa, as firms might see the price increase as an opportunity 
to acquire additional profits. If anything, table 7 indicates that a price increase leads to firms 
reducing their cross-ownership, however, none of the results are statistically significant. 
Therefore, it seems likely that cross-ownership changes precede price changes. 
Table 8 addresses potential endogeneity concerns regarding market shares being picked up by 
the HHI and the MHHI-delta. I therefore repeat the analysis done in table 4, but this time I use 
the average market share of each firm throughout the period when calculating the MHHI-delta. 
These results are not statistically significant, indicating that table 4 suffered from endogeneity 
issues. However, due to the limited number of observations, using average market shares gives 
us half as many different MHHI-delta values throughout the period. This particular regression 
therefore suffers more than the others from limited observations. Still, we keep the results in 
mind when considering the validity of table 4. 
An issue with most of the analyses is the wide market definition, as it is not necessarily plausible 
to consider all books to be part of the same market, as they appeal to various consumer groups. 
In addition to this, just as mergers are mainly problematic in concentrated markets, so is cross-
ownership, as the effects of this will always be smaller than those of a full merger. Table 9 
attempts to solve for both these issues. I narrow the market definition to only apply to cheap 
books, which is listed as its own submarket by Forleggerforeningen. I chose this particular 
submarket as it has a significant amount of cross-ownership, and it is highly concentrated. If 
cross-ownership has anticompetitive effects in the publishing industry, I would expect it to be 
shown in this market. The somewhat surprising result is that, while the coefficient in table 9, 
column 2 is similar to column 2 in table 4, it is not statistically significant. When including the 
lagged MHHI-delta and HHI, the coefficient is in fact negative, though not statistically 
significant. In other words, table 9 shows no evidence on cross-ownership impacting the market 
price, even though the market is highly concentrated. This regression also serves to dismiss the 
validity of the results in table 4, and it might be an indication that the previous market definition 
was too wide, which led to estimation bias. 
Lastly, I did a panel data regression to illustrate how I would recommend the competition 
authorities to do the analysis, should they decide to investigate cross-ownership in the future. 
Though naturally, they would include monthly or quarterly data, several more submarkets and 
control variables, as explained above. The most surprising result in table 10 was that when 
regressing the price on the lagged MHHI-delta, we got a negative coefficient which was 
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statistically significant at a 1%-level. However, as previously discussed, the panel regression 




In this paper I examine whether cross-ownership has had anticompetitive effects in the 
publishing market. In order to do this, I regressed book consumer-prices on a measure of cross-
ownership taken from recent IO-literature, MHHI-delta (Salop & O’Brien, 2000), and other 
control variables. Publishing was an interesting sector to investigate as it is fairly concentrated, 
especially some of the submarkets are highly concentrated, and there has been a varying degree 
of cross-ownership throughout the period.  
I regressed the price on the MHHI-delta in various specifications. Most of the results showed a 
price increasing effect resulting from increases in cross-ownership, however, most of the results 
were not statistically significant. Which indicates that there may have been a price increase due 
to cross-ownership, but no conclusive evidence was found. Similar results throughout various 
specifications indicate some level of robustness. The most surprising result was that the silent 
financial interests assumption showed a larger effect on the price than the proportional control 
assumption which defies theory, as more control rights should mean stronger anticompetitive 
effects. The panel regression was an illustration of how I would recommend future analyses to 
be done, as panel data is likely necessary to find better estimates. The surprising result here was 
that when utilizing the lagged MHHI-delta, the price effect was negative. The fixed price system 
also impacts the price. Though better controlling for this would be beneficial, the lagged MHHI-
delta might indicate how the price is affected by cross-ownership after the fixed price period. 
If so, it seems that it has a stronger effect then, than during the fixed price period. However, as 
the price increase of cross-ownership might be delayed due to other reasons, we should be 
careful in this interpretation. After checking several different specifications, I did not find 
evidence that H0 can be dismissed. As the Competition Authorities have not intervened, I 
expect they have reached a similar conclusion, as they need to show that the acquisition will 
result in anticompetitive effects. This shows that proving that price changes emerge as a result 
of changes in cross-ownership is complicated as there are many factors that simultaneously 
impact the price. 
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While this paper does not show anticompetitive effects of cross-ownership in the publishing 
sector, I believe further analyses should be done. In the future, I would recommend repeating 
the panel regression methodology. However, more submarkets should be included, as well as 
firm specific effects. Monthly or quarterly data should also be employed. Controlling for 
demand shifts from traditional books to audio books would also likely be beneficial. The 
inclusion of a demand variable would also help show whether price changes are due to changes 
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